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IN RE FEDERAL'S, INC., ANOTHER ROUND IN
THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE RECLAMING CREDIT
SELLER AND THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE
RICHARD A. MANN* AND MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS**
I. INTRODUCTION
S ince its inception fifteen years ago, section 2-702 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) has generated a lively judicial and
academic debate concerning the relative rights of the reclaiming credit
seller and the trustee in bankruptcy.1 This debate to some degree
results from the difficult technical legal issues produced by the
U.C.C.'s intrusion into this area,2 but, more generally, reflects a basic
underlying policy conflict between the seller's interests and those of the
trustee, a conflict indicative of quite tangible financial interests. 3 The
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business Administration, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Professor Mann received his B.S. from the University of North
Carolina in 1968 and his J.D. from Yale University in 1973.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University. Professor
Phillips received his B.A. from Johns Hopkins University in 1968, his J.D. from the Columbia
University School of Law in 1973, and his LL.M. from the National Law Center, George
Washington University in 1975.
1. See, e.g., Ashe, Reclamation Under UCC-An Exercise in Futility: Defrauded Seller v.
Trustee in Bankruptcy, 43 Ref. J. 78 (1969); Bjornstad, Reclamation of Goods by Unsecured
Sellers in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24 Drake L. Rev. 357 (1975); Braucher, Reclamation of Goods
from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1281 (1967); Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of
Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.MLL. Rev. 435 (1971); Hawkland, The Relative Rights of Lien
Creditors and Defrauded Sellers-Amending the Uniform Commercial Code To Conform to the
Kravitz Case, 67 Com. L.J. 86 (1962); Henson, Reclamation Rights of Sellers Under Section
2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41 (1975); Kennedy, The Interest of a Redaindng Seller Under Article 2 of
the Code, 30 Bus. Law. 833 (1975); King, Reclamation Petition Granted: In Defense of the
Defrauded Seller, 44 Ref. J. 81 (1970); Shanker, Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 40 Ref. J. 37 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Shanker]; Shanker, A Reply to the
Proposed Amendment of UCC Section 2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights vs. Rights
of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 W. Res. L. Rev. 93 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Shanker-Reply;
Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Right To Recover the
Goods Upon Insolvency, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 598 (1966). See generally, 3-4A Collier on Bankruptcy
(14th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Collier] (containing considerable material bearing on this
problem). See also 3A R. Dusenberg & L. King, Sales & Bulk Transfers Under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 13.03 (1966); R. Nordstrom, Handbook of the Law of Sales §§ 167-69 (1970);
J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 7-15
(1972). This listing is by no means exhaustive.
2. It is possible that the proposed revision of the Bankruptcy Act presently before Congress
could rectify this situation. For a discussion of this possibility, see Edelman & Weintraub, Seller's
Right To Reclaim Property UnderSection 2-702(2) of the Code Under the Bankruptcy Act: Fact or
Fancy, 32 Bus. Law. 1165 (1977).
3. Professor Henson has concluded from official 1969 statistics that the unsecured creditor
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conflict between the seller and the trustee has generally 4 arisen in the
situation where a seller delivers goods on credit to an insolvent buyer
who goes into bankruptcy after their receipt but before the seller can
demand their reclamation. The Sixth Circuit's recent decision in the
case of In re Federal's, Inc., 5 displays all of the complex issues
involved in this particular situation while adding a few twists of its
own.
This Article is intended to assess the impact of the Federal's deci-
sion, the fourth circuit court case" to deal with the credit seller-trustee
controversy. 6 This requires some treatment of the historical bases and
dimensions of the controversy. Thus, this Article will begin with a
brief description of the pre-Code remedies traditionally available to the
credit seller. 7 An historical introduction is necessary for two reasons.
First, the Code draftsmen were clearly not writing on a tabula rasa
when devising section 2-702, and the exact relationship between that
section and its common law predecessors is crucial to many of the cases
to be discussed. Second, many other such cases have utilized, or have
permitted the option of utilizing, pre-Code law to determine the rights
of the 2-702 seller as against the trustee. Next, this Article will
examine the procedural requirements for a reclamation under section
2-702.8 It will then suggest several possible characterizations of the
2-702 reclamation right-characterizations which are often decisive in
the cases involving the clash between the seller and the trustee. 9
Following this, the Article will examine section 2-702's interaction with
the Bankruptcy Act in the three basic bankruptcy contexts in which
this clash has arisen, those involving sections 70(c), 67c(l)(A), and 64(a)
of the Act. 10 After this, it will undertake a detailed examination of the
Federal's litigation at the bankruptcy, district, and circuit court
levels.II Finally, a concluding section will attempt to assess the impact
(e.g., a § 2-702 reclaimant who could not prevail against the trustee) "in an average asset case
would receive less than eight cents per dollar claimed, and about 90 percent of all bankruptcies
are no-asset cases." Henson, supra note 1, at 51 n.37.
4. For an overview of all the dimensions of the clash between seller and trustee, see Mann &
Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Act: A Roadmap of the Strategies, 18 B.C.
Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 609 (1977).
5. 553 f.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977), rev'g 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
6. See In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761 (%th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
969 (1976); In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820
(3d Cir. 1960).
7. See notes 13-28 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 29-51 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 52-62 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 63-121 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 122-79 infra and accompanying text.
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of the Sixth Circuit's Federal's decision on this long, involved, and as
yet unresolved controversy. 12
11. BACKGROUND
A. Common Law Antecedents
At common law the unpaid credit seller could avail himself of a
variety of remedies, one of which was an action for the price.1 3
Another remedy-which, when available, was of greater utility against
an insolvent buyer-was to rescind the sale upon the ground of fraud
and attempt to recover the goods. 14 Under this remedy the buyer was
considered to have received merely a voidable title. As a result, the
parties could be restored to their original precontractual position by an
equitable operation in which full title to the goods was viewed as never
having passed. 15 However, the buyer's voidable title enabled him to
pass full title to a good faith purchaser for value, from whom the seller
could not reclaim the goods. 16 On the other hand, the seller who
rescinded usually had rights superior to those of an attaching lien
creditor. 17 In addition, the seller's right to rescind and reclaim sur-
vived the debtor's going into bankruptcy because the trustee was
deemed to have taken title to the bankrupt's property subject to the
retroactive divestment effected by such a rescission.18
Despite considerable variation among the states, the courts appear
to have granted the seller the right to rescind and reclaim the goods in
two basic situations: 19 (1) when the buyer received the goods without
the intent to pay for them;20 and (2) when the buyer made material
misrepresentations of solvency and thereby induced the sale. 2' Cir-
cumstantial evidence, including proof of the buyer's insolvency at the
12. See notes 180-88 infra and accompanying text.
13. See 3 Williston on Sales § 561 (rev. ed. 1948).
14. See, e.g., L. Void, Handbook of the Law of Sales § 79, at 397 (2d ed. 1959); 77 C.J.S.
Sales §§ 45-51 (1952).
15. See, e.g., Void, supra note 14, § 79, at 397-98.
16. E.g., id. at 400-01.
17. See, e.g., Thaxter v. Foster, 153 Mass. 151, 26 N.E. 434 (1891). See also note 185 infra.
18. See, e.g., Fisher v. Shreve, Crump & Low Co., 7 F.2d 159 (D. Mass. 1925); Mulroney
Mfg. Co. v. Weeks, 185 Iowa 714, 171 N.W. 36 (1919). See generally, Annor., 59 A.LR 418
(1929).
19. For cases explidtly making this distinction, see O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297
F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1961); Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 1928); In re
Gurvitz, 276 F. 931, 932 (D. Mass. 1921). See also Annot., 59 A.L.R. 418 (1929).
20. See, e.g., O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1961); 77 C.J.S.
Sales § 50 (1952).
21. E.g., Annot., 59 A.L.R. 418, 418-24 (1929).
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time of receiving the goods,22 could be introduced to demonstrate the
intent not to pay required in the first situation. However, this was
usually regarded as only presumptive proof of the intent to defraud, 23
and could be rebutted by showing the buyer's good faith intent to pay
for the goods and a reasonable basis for his belief that he could do so. 24
Although in the second situation the misrepresentation need not have
been intentional, 25 it was usually required that it be one of present
fact-not an expression of opinion or promise 26-and that the seller
have relied upon the misrepresentation. 27 Furthermore, in some states
there was the additional requirement that the seller's reliance have
been reasonable under the circumstances, or that he have exercised
reasonable prudence, including appropriate investigations, in so rely-
ing. 28
B. The Reclamation Right Under Section 2-702
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the credit seller who has not
received payment can pursue the variety of remedies listed in section
2-703.29 After delivery of the goods far fewer remedies remain avail-
able to the seller, who then has only an action for the price3 ° and
possibly for incidental damages. 31
However, in order to recover the specific goods sold, the seller must
proceed under section 2-702(2), which provides:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent
he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt, but if
misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within
22. See id. at 426-28.
23. In re Paper City Mill Supply Co., 28 F.2d 115 (D. Mass. 1928).
24. E.g., In re Empire Grocery Co., 277 F. 73 (D. Mass, 1921); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 52 (1952).
Where the buyer honestly intended to pay but had no reasonable basis for expecting to be able to
do so, the seller typically was able to rescind. See, e.g., In re Gurvitz, 276 F. 931, 932 (D. Mass.
1921).
25. E.g., Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 1928).
26. See, e.g., Void, supra note 14, § 79, at 399-400; 77 C.J.S. Sales §§ 46, 48 (1952).
27. See, e.g., 77 C.J.S. Sales § 48 (1952). There was often some disagreement as to the degree
of reliance required, however. Compare, e.g., O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1, 5
(8th Cir. 1961), with National Shawmut Bank v. Johnson, 317 Mass. 485, 490, 58 N.E.2d 849,
852 (1945), and Butler v. Martin, 247 Mass. 169, 173, 142 N.E. 42, 43 (1923).
28. See, e.g., Wead v. Ganzhorn, 216 Iowa 478, 48082, 249 N.W. 271, 272-73 (1933); 77
C.J.S. Sales § 48, at 684 (1952).
29. These include: withholding delivery of the goods, stoppage of delivery in transit (U.C.C.
§ 2-705), identification of goods to the contract (U.C.C. § 2-704), resale and recovery of the
difference between the resale price and the contract price (U.C.C. § 2-706), damages for
non-acceptance or repudiation (U.C.C. § 2-708), an action for the price (U.C.C. § 2-709), and
cancellation.
30. Id. § 2-709.
31. Id. § 2-710.
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three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided
in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's
fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay. 32
In addition, the current Code expressly subordinates this reclamation
right to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith
purchaser. 33
In order to take advantage of the reclamation right provided by
section 2-702(2), the seller must meet a number of technical require-
ments imposed by this section. First, the seller must discover that the
buyer had received the goods while "insolvent." An insolvent party is
defined as one "who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary
course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is
insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law."34 Sec-
ond, the seller must demand the goods within ten days of their receipt
by the buyer unless there is a written misrepresentation of solvency
within three months of delivery. 35 This ten-day period has been held to
run from the day after the goods have been received until the tenth day
after such receipt.36 It would seem likely that actual physical reposses-
sion of the goods within the ten-day period is not required, 37 but the
cases diverge sharply as to what minimum action must be taken by the
seller. One case has suggested in dictum that "an act of demanding or
asking" 38 may be enough. Another case-again in dictum-appears to
have considered a telephone call to be sufficient. 39 However, some
decisions have treated a bare oral demand as inadequate, stating that
some sort of "follow-up" is required.40 It is uncertain what is involved
in a follow-up, 4 1 but one case has implied thai a reclamation petition
filed in bankruptcy, even though entered more than ten days after
receipt of the goods, may be sufficient to satisfy this requirement. 42
32. Id. § 2-702(2).
33. Id. § 2-702(3). The 1962 version of § 2-702(3) also subordinated the seller to the rights of a
lien creditor. See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
34. U.C.C. § 1-201(23).
35. Id. § 2-702(2).
36. In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
37. See, e.g., White & Summers, supra note 1, § 7-15, at 242.
38. In re Childress, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 505, 507 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (quoting Webster's
dictionary as to the meaning of the term "demand").
39. Metropolitan Distribs. v. Eastern Supply Co., 21 Pa. D. & C. 2d 128, 134 (C. P.
Allegheny County 1959).
40. In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 1974); In re Behring &
Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
41. In re Collad's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974), spoke of "a regaining of
possession or a bona fide attempt to do so." Id. at 1121. In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 600 (N.D. Tex. 1968), spoke of "any type of legal action or effort to regain peaceable
repossession without legal action." Id. at 606.
42. See In re Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606-07 (N.D. Tex. 1968).
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However, the ten-day limitation has no application "if misrepresen-
tation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing
within three months before delivery." 4 3 A Code Comment states that
in order for this exception to come into effect "the statement of
solvency must be in writing, addressed to the particular seller and
dated within three months of the delivery." 44 However, the last
requirement has been ignored by a case holding that the writing need
only have been presented to the seller within three months of the
delivery. 4 5 The courts have also held a signed purchase order4 6 and a
letter virtually admitting insolvency, but setting out a schedule of
payments, 47 not to be "writings," while generally regarding a check as
fitting within this category. 48 Notwithstanding the absence of such a
requirement in the language of section 2-702(2), it has further been
held that the seller must have relied upon the writing. 4 9 Moreover,
some cases have stated that the seller must have been acting with the
prudence of an ordinary businessman in so relying.50 Finally, it has
been explicitly stated that the Code's requirement of good faith applies
to the seller's conduct in this situation. 5 '
C. Possible Characterizations of Section 2-702(2)
As will be seen, the manner in which section 2-702 is characterized
is often determinative of whether the reclaiming credit seller succeeds
in reclaiming goods from the trustee. There are three possible charac-
terizations of section 2-702 that could be decisive:52 (1) as a codification
of the common law remedy of rescission for fraud, (2) as an article 2
security interest,53 or (3) as a statutory lien. The first of these charac-
terizations would seem the most significant in light of the defrauded
43. U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
44. Id., Comment 2.
45. In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210, 1212 (9th Cir. 1971).
46. See In re Regency Furniture, Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1381 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
47. See In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 46 (D. Conn. 1965).
48. See, e.g., In re Creative Bldgs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974); Amoco Pipeline Co.
v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114, 117 (10th Cir. 1974); Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v.
First Trust & Say. Bank, 103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 195, 242 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1968); In re Bar-Wood,
Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828 (S.D. Fla. 1974); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 96, 107-08 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
49. See In re Creative Bldgs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Fairfield Elevator
Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 107-08 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. First
Trust & Say. Bank, 103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 195, 242 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1968).
SO. See cases cited note 49 supra.
51. Id.
52. Here we are concerned with characterizations of § 2-702 arising independently of
Bankruptcy Act definitions. Thus, its possible characterization as a "priority" will not be
discussed here. See notes 107-12 infra and accompanying text.
53. See U.C.C. § 9-113 and Comments 1-5.
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seller's ability to recover against the trustee under the pre-Code law of
most jurisdictions. 54 To begin with, it is clear that the section 2-702(2)
reclamation right was not created ex nihilo; it has an obvious historical
antecedent in the common law rescission right. In particular, its "ten
day demand" and "written misrepresentation" provisions would seem
to derive from the two situations giving rise to the right of rescission at
common law. 55 Nonetheless, section 2-702 differs from the pre-Code
remedy in some fairly significant respects. First, its ten-day and
three-month time limitations did not exist at common law. Second,
section 2-702(2) eases to a considerable extent the evidentiary burden
on the seller. Under prior law, the buyer's receipt of the goods while
insolvent usually established only a rebuttable presumption of fraud, 56
while according to the Code comment, section 2-702(2) "takes as its
base line the proposition that any receipt of goods on credit by an
insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of sol-
vency and therefore is fraudulent as against the particular seller."57
Finally, under pre-Code law a seller who based his recovery for fraud
on the buyer's misrepresentation was required to show that he had
justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation.58 Section 2-702(2) does
not explicitly include such a requirement, although certain cases
decided under the Code have grafted this requirement onto the sec-
tio0. 59
On the other hand, section 2-702 might be characterized as a
security interest or a statutory lien. The U.C.C. defines the term
"security interest" as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation. '60 Although this
definition would seem sufficiently broad to include the section 2-702(2)
reclamation right, there is authority to the contrary. 61 The remaining
possibility is that section 2-702(2) might be regarded as sufficiently
similar to the host of legislatively created state liens benefitting certain
classes of parties supplying goods or services to be classed as a
"statutory lien." The determination of the appropriateness of this
54. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 19-28 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
57. U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 2.
58. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
60. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
61. See, e.g., In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968); Ranchers &
Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
See also the authorities cited in Note, Uniform Commercial Code-§ 2-702: Conflict with §
67c(1)(A) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 169, 174 n.24 (1974).
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characterization depends largely upon whether the section' is consid-
ered predominately a codification of the common law fraud remedy.
The basis and implications of such a determination will receive closer
attention under the treatment of section 67c(l)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Act.62
MI]. CONFLICTS BETWEEN SECTION 2-702 AND THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
When the seller attempts to reclaim the goods after the petition in
bankruptcy has been filed he will face a trustee who will assert that the
2-702(2) reclamation right is either subordinate to the trustee's title to
the bankrupt's property or invalidated by some provision of the
Bankruptcy Act. If the trustee's contention prevails, the seller is
relegated to the status of an unsecured creditor who must share pro
rata with the hordes of other creditors. On the other hand, if the
seller's reclamation right survives the trustee's attacks, he will recover
the goods, which, even if they have depreciated, will usually greatly
exceed in value the seller's recovery as a general creditor. These
financial stakes, coupled with the uncertain characterization of the
reclamation right, have produced considerable litigation-and utter
confusion-as to the relative rights of the seller and the trustee. The
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that a trustee will most likely utilize
against the seller who demands the goods after bankruptcy are sections
70(c), 67c(1)(A), and 64(a).
A. Section 70(c)
Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act provides in relevant part that
[t]he trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of . . . a
creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable
proceedings upon all property . . . upon which a creditor of the bankrupt upon a
simple contract could have obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor
exists.
6 3
Section 70(c) provides the trustee with the rights of an "ideal lien
creditor" who is "armed cap-a-pie with every right and power which is
conferred by the law of the state upon its most favored creditor who
has acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings. ' 64 However, the
trustee is considered to have perfected his lien on the date of bank-
62. See notes 83-106 infra and accompanying text.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
64. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822 (3d Cir. 1960) (quoting In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60
F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932)). For this reason, § 70(c) has been called the "strong-arm"
clause of the Bankruptcy Act. Id.
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ruptcy, 65 and is thus precluded from superseding the claims of preced-
ing lienholders or other interested parties by choosing the optimal
time(s) to have perfected his hypothetical lien. Nonetheless, section
70(c) does not require the trustee to locate an actual, existing party
who could have asserted the right assumed by the trustee, 66 although
there are cases to the contrary. 67
The rights of an "ideal lien creditor" are determined by state law,
which in this context is the Uniform Commercial Code. An earlier
version of section 2-702(3) provided a seemingly lucid pronouncement
regarding the rights of lien creditors against the reclaiming seller: "The
seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor
under this Article (Section 2-403)."68 Taken together with section 70(c)
of the Bankruptcy Act, this statement would appear to provide that
the trustee should invariably defeat the reclaiming 2-702 seller. How-
ever, the Third Circuit's famous and controversial decision in In re
Kravit 69 read this language quite differently. Its conclusions have
generated a raging polemic among commercial and bankruptcy law
commentators with the result that serious code ambiguities and omis-
sions in this area have been exposed.
Kravitz involved the competing rights of the seller and the trustee to
goods delivered on credit to the buyer three days before the buyer's
involuntary petition in bankruptcy. One day after the filing of the
petition the seller attempted to rescind the sale in a manner that
presumably satisfied the requirements of section 2-702(2). However,
both the bankruptcy referee and the district court denied the seller's
claim, and the court of appeals affirmed.70 After pursuing the effect of
65. See Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961). "[MIf we construe § 70c as
petitioner does, there would be no period of repose. Security transactions entered into in good
faith years before the bankruptcy could be upset if the trustee were ingenious enough to conjure
up a hypothetical situation in which a hypothetical creditor might have had such a right." Id. at
609. See also notes 166-69 infra and accompanying text.
66. See 4A Collier, supra note 1, 70.50, at 609-14.
67. See, e.g., Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1962).
68. U.C.C. § 2-702 (1962 version).
69. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
70. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960). Neither the referee's decision nor the district
court decision has been published. However, Professor Morris Shanker, who personally examined
the full Kravitz file, has concluded that: 1) Kravitz was decided under an earlier version of §
2-702(2) which lacked the current exclusion of the common law fraud remedy (on the latter, see
notes 115-19 infra and accompanying text); 2) the district court opinion seemed to hold that the
§ 2-702 reclamation right would be unavailable to the seller because of its subordination to a lien
creditor via what is now § 2-702(3); 3) counsel for the seller definitely advanced a common
law fraud theory before the referee; and 4) the case therefore proceeded largely under a common
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section 2-702(3)'s reference to section 2-403 upon the lien creditor's
rights, the court concluded that "Section 2-403(4) refers the rights of
lien creditors to, inter alia, Article 9 and Section 9-301(3) says that the
term 'lien creditor' includes 'a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of
the filing of the petition .... ' "71 After a discussion of Section 70(c) of
the Bankruptcy Act, the court reconciled the two provisions in the
following fashion:
We think the correct way to put the matter is that by federal law the trustee in
bankruptcy is made a lien creditor and that this right thus given him is recognized by
the Uniform Commercial Code which simply states the power of the trustee as created
by the prevailing law, that is, the federal law of bankruptcy.
72
But, while the Kravitz court found no inconsistency within the Code or
between the Code and the Bankruptcy Act-thus effectively subsum-
ing section 2-702(3)'s "lien creditor" language under section 70(c)-it
apparently did not regard the Code as dispositive on the rights of a lien
creditor as against the reclaiming seller. Instead, the court resorted to
pre-Code Pennsylvania law, 73 which held that the reclaiming seller-
even when defrauded-could not triumph over certain lien creditors.
74
On this basis, the court found for the trustee.
75
The reaction to Kravitz came quickly. By 1962 at least two states
had amended or enacted section 2-702(3) to eliminate the "lien credi-
tor" language. 76 In commenting on this reaction, Professor William
Hawkland took note that Kravitz did not mean that the trustee would
inevitably triumph through the operation of Code sections 2-702(3),
2-403(4), and 9-301(3), because that case was "an anomaly peculiar to
Pennsylvania" resulting from that state's unusual pre-Code rule regard-
ing the relative rights of the reclaiming seller and a lien creditor.
77
Although he maintained that the legislative history of section 2-702
really made such a change unnecessary, he nonetheless advocated an
amendment to section 2-702(3) deleting its "or lien creditor" lan-
law fraud theory before the lower courts. See Shanker, supra note 1, at 42. However, the court of
appeals, while not completely clear as to the theory under which it was proceeding, did give
considerable attention to § 2-702, as the following discussion should indicate.
71. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1960).
72. Id. at 822.
73. The cases relied on were Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156 Pa. 258, 27 A. 300 (1893), and
Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280 (1901). See note 169 infra.
74. In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822 (3d Cir. 1960).
75. Id.
76. See 1961 Ill. Laws 2147 (codified at Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 26, § 2-702 (Smith-Hurd 1974)); ch.
96, 1961 N.M. Laws (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-2-702 (1962)).
77. Hawkland, supra note 1, at 88.
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guage.78 In 1966, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code adopted this change, although a considerable ma-
jority of the states still preserve the pre-1966 version. 79
In the wake of Kravitz and the 1966 amendment, however, a variety
of other approaches to this problem have emerged among the courts
and the commentators. In those states which have not adopted the
1966 amendment, there have been two basic approaches. The first of
these essentially supports the Kravitz result: utilization of pre-Code
law to determine the relative rights of seller and lien creditor.80 In
most states,81 this should enable the seller to defeat the lien creditor/
trustee. The second approach views the Code as a self-contained body
of law in which the seller is expressly subordinated to a lien creditor by
section 2-702(3), without any cross references to section 2-403 and to
article 9.82 This approach should result in a triumph for the trustee in
all states retaining the original section 2-702(3) language.
On the other hand, in states which have adopted the 1966 amend-
ment the seller is almost always likely to win. If, as seems most
probable, the amendment is construed as eliminating from the Code
78. "[T]here is no indication whatsoever from the legislative history of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code that 2-702 was intended to give the trustee more rights vis-a-vis the defrauded seller
than he was accorded under previous law. Because 2-702(3), however, can be read as doing
precisely what its draftsmen manifestly did not want done, an amendment to the section seems in
order ...
"The amendment to 2-702(3), of course, should not be considered as legislative history for the
conclusion that the defrauded seller necessarily prevails over the trustee in bankruptcy. Its
intention is merely to adopt the rule of the Kravitz Case, as correctly read and applied." Id.
79. For a more or less current listing, see Uniform Laws Annotated, Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-702, at 350 (1976). According to that listing, sixteen states have adopted the new
language.
80. See, e.g., In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Royalty
Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 61, 63-64 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); notes 124-26, 142, 163 infra and
accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 1, at 457; Hawkland, supra note 1, at 88. See also note
185 infra.
82. See Shanker-Reply, supra note 1, at 96-98; Shanker, supra note 1, at 40-41; Countryman,
supra note 1, at 457. This view seems to have been followed in several cases. See In re Goodson
Steel Corp., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 387, 391-93 (S.D. Tex. 1968); In re Behring & Behring, S
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606-07 (N.D. Tex. 1968); In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 46,
48-49 (D. Conn. 1965); In re Eastern Supply Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 151, 153-54 (W.D. Pa.
1963), a'd, 331 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964). See also notes 124, 142 infra and accompanying text.
Also, Professor Shanker has argued that the § 2-702(2) seller should be subordinated to the
trustee because goods now should be deemed "on sale or return" under § 2-326, and because
the § 2-702 reclamation right is an unperfected security interest subject to a Hen creditor under
§ 9-301(lXb). Shanker-Reply, supra note 1, at 98-106. But see note 61 supra and accompanying
text (citing cases indicating that the § 2-702 reclamation right is not an article nine security
interest).
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any pretense of determining the relative rights of seller and lien
creditor, recourse to pre-Code law will be unavoidable. As has been
discussed, this should enable the credit seller to recover from the
trustee in most states. However, the amendment might also be viewed
in the light of its history as a positive assertion that the seller is to
triumph over the lien creditor in all situations, including those in
which the state's rule at common law would have favored the lien
creditor.
B. Section 67c(1)
Even if the seller attempting to reclaim after bankruptcy is not
frustrated by section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, he may still run
afoul of section 67c(1)(A) 83 thereof, which in relevant part states that
''every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency
of the debtor" will be "invalid against the trustee. '84 Since the 2-702(2)
reclamation right depends upon the seller's discovery of the buyer's
insolvency, it would seem to satisfy that requirement of section
67c(1)(A). 85 Thus, the crucial question is whether section 2-702 is a
"statutory lien."'86 The cases that have dealt with this issue have
83. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970). Commentary on the relationship between § 2-702(2)
and § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act includes: Henson, Reclamation Rights of Sellers Under
Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41 (1975); Note, In Re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc.: A Hasty
Invalidation of UCC § 2-702(2) as a Statutory Lien Under § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act, 32
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1001 (1975); Note, Uniform Commercial Code-§ 2-702: Conflict with §
67c(1)(A) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 169 (1974); Note, In Re Federal's, Inc.:
A New Way for the Trustee in Bankruptcy To Defeat a Reclaiming Seller, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 922
(1974).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970).
85. The Bankruptcy Act states that "[a] person shall be deemed insolvent within the
provisions of this title whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he
may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed,
with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient In
amount to pay his debts." Id.'§ 1(19) (1970). The Uniform Commercial Code, on the other hand,
states that "[a] person is 'insolvent' who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course
of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent within the meaning of the
federal bankruptcy law." U.C.C. § 1-201(23). Obviously, the Code definition of insolvency Is
broader than that of the Bankruptcy Act, and for this reason there may be instances in which a
valid demand under § 2-702 may not become "effective upon the insolvency of the debtor" in the
bankruptcy sense. But see 4 Collier, supra note 1, 67.28112.1], at 419-20 (suggesting that the
state law definition of insolvency should apply in case of a discrepancy).
Also, it might be argued that the 2-702(2) reclamation right is conditioned on a host of factors
other than the debtor's insolvency. See Note, In Re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc.: A Hasty
Invalidation of UCC § 2-702(2) as a Statutory Lien Under § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act, 32
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1001, 1014 (1975).
86. For cases holding that § 2-702(2) is a statutory lien, see In re Good Deal Supermar-
kets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887 (D.N.J. 1974); In re Perskey &Wolf, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 812
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usually raised three basic questions: (1) whether the section 2-702
remedy is actually "statutory"; (2) whether the 2-702 reclamation right
is a "lien"; and (3) the legislative intent and purpose of section 67c.
With respect to the first of these issues, section 1(29a) of the
Bankruptcy Act defines a "statutory lien" as
a lien arising solely by force of statute upon specified circumstances or conditions, but
[it] shall not include any lien provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give
security, whether or not such lien is also provided by or is also dependent upon statute
and whether or not the agreement or lien is made fully effective by statute.
7
The 2-702(2) reclamation right clearly arises "by force of statute
upon specified circumstances or conditions," but one court, stressing
section 2-702's relationship with the common law remedy of rescission
for fraud and Official Code Comment 2,88 has argued that it does not
"solely" so arise. 89 However, the cases reaching the contrary conclu-
sion have done so by emphasizing the differences between section
2-702(2) and the traditional fraud remedy.90
The definition of the term "statutory lien" in section 1(29a) seems to
assume the existence of a recognized meaning for the term "lien,"
despite the fact that neither the Code nor the Bankruptcy Act defines
the term. As a general matter, a "lien" seems to be regarded as a hold
or claim on property for the payment of some debt, obligation, or
duty. 9 1 This definition implies that upon payment of the debt the lien
(N.D. Ohio 1976); In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887 (S,D.N.Y. 1975); In re Wetson's
Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also In re Nieves, 446 F.Zd 188 (1st Cir.
1971); In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968); notes
134-35, 151-54, 158-61 infra and accompanying text. But see In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc.,
524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 969 (1976); In re National Bdlas Hess, Inc.,
17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (1970).
88. "Subsection (2) takes as its base line the proposition that any receipt of goods on credit by
an insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is
fraudulent as against the particular seller." U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 2; see notes 56-59 supra
and accompanying text.
89. See In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
One commentator, however, has suggested that this argument should not be utilized, principally
because it would involve a burdensome comparison of the alleged lien with various possible
common law antecedents in order to determine its status as "solely statutory." See Note, In Re
Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc.: A Hasty Invalidation of UCC § 2-702(2) as a Statutory Lien
Under § 67(c)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Act, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1001, 1009-10 (1975).
90. See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 889-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Wetson's
Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also notes 151-54 infra and
accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., 51 Am. Jur. 2d Liens § 1 (1970); Black's Law Dictionary 1072-73 (4th ed. rev.
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should terminate. Some courts have seized upon this implication and
have maintained that since the 2-702(2) right similarly terminates upon
successful reclamation, it is in effect a "lien."' 92 However, another
court found the exclusivity of the 2-702 remedy93 to differentiate it
from the typical lien, since a lien-holder can sell the property and
recover any deficiency from the debtor as an unsecured creditor,
whereas the 2-702 seller may not.94 Finally, if section 2-702(2) is
viewed as a codification of the common law fraud remedy, it should
not be considered a lien.
With respect to the legislative history, the usual tendency of courts
which hold that section 67c(1)(A) invalidates the 2-702(2) reclamation
right in bankruptcy is to view the 1966 amendments to section 6795 as
part of an ongoing process 96 by which the trustee's powers to invali-
date an ever-expanding collection of state priorities-disguised-as-liens 97
have been augmented so as to keep pace with this expansion. 98
However, the legislative history accompanying these amendments99
makes no reference either to section 2-702 of the Code or to the Kravitz
1968). For a compendium of definitions of this term, see Note, Uniform Commercial Code-
§ 2-702: Conflict with § 67c(1)(A) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 169, 172 (1974).
92. In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Wetson's
Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
93. "Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them."
U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
94. In re National Bellas Hess, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 430, 432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But
see notes 158-59 infra and accompanying text.
95. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, §§ 3, 4, 80 Stat. 268 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 107(b), (c) (1970)).
96. In 1938, § 64 of the Act was amended to eliminate the general recognition In bankruptcy
of state-created priorities. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 64, 52 Stat. 874. This led to a variety
of state efforts to cast what arguably were actual priorities in the guise of liens, thus ensuring
such otherwise-invalid priorities an enhanced payment status. See, e.g., In re Giltex, Inc., 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Thus, in 1966, § 67 was amended to expand the list
of statutory liens specifically declared invalid in bankruptcy, mainly by means of new § 67c
(1XA), (B), and (C). Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, §§ 3, 4, 80 Stat. 268 (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 107(b), (c) (1970)). The general recognition of state-created statutory liens was
retained in the new § 67b. Id.
97. On the distinction between priorities and liens, see 3A Collier, supra note 1, 64.02[2], at
2065-69.
98. See In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887,1892-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Wetson's
Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 427-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc.,
384 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D.N.J. 1974).
99. Relevant here are S. Rep. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2456; S. Rep. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in
[1966] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2442; and H.R. Rep. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), reprinted in [1966] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2442.
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problem. Notwithstanding this, the history does reveal a congressional
concern to invalidate both "liens creating a noncontingent property
interest in a specific asset" (section 2-702(2) clearly gives a right to
specific goods) and "liens which became effective only in the event of
insolvency" (section 2-702(2) by its terms, should apply only in this
case). 100 Nevertheless, it appears that the history excepts from the
purview of section 67c(1)(A) "a specific property right which may be
asserted independently of a general distribution and regardless of the
transfer of the property." 10 1 Although section 2-702(2) applies only in
the event of insolvency-or, more precisely, the seller's discovery
thereof-and thus could operate "independently of a general distribu-
tion"102 if there were no such distribution, it could not operate
"regardless of the transfer of the property" 10 3 since section 2-702(3)
expressly subordinates the seller to a "buyer in ordinary course or other
good faith purchaser."' 0 4 All of thisos notwithstanding, it has also
been held that section 2-702's alleged basis in the common law of fraud
places it outside the legislative purpose of section 67c.10 6 This indicates
once more the wide-ranging impact of the basic problem of characteriz-
ing section 2-702(2)'s genesis and nature.
100. S. Rep. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2456, 2457.
101. Id. at 2461.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
105. The foregoing discussion of § 67c's legislative history should be compared with the
discussion in In re Giltex, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 892-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
106. See In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 969 (1976). As the court there stated: "Section 67c, as amended in 1966, is an attempt to
minimize state conflicts with federal priorities by invalidating as against the trustee some of the
more obviously spurious liens, those which function more as priorities in bankruptcy than as
property interests.
"Section 67c is thus a remedial trimming-back of the special exemption conferred on statutory
liens by section 67b. It was not intended to serve as a new tool by which the trustee could cut
down provisions of state law obviously not entitled to the benefits of section 67b. As discussed
below, under section 2-702(2) receipt of goods on credit while insolvent is deemed a fraud on the
creditor rendering the sale voidable. The sale thus is defective from its inception. Clearly no new
security has been given for an antecedent debt; the 'lien,' if it is conceived as such, attached at the
instant the debt was created.... Section 2-702(2) clearly, therefore, was not an attempt to escape
the effect of section 60 by creating a spurious statutory lien, and enactment of section 2-702(2) did
not present the abuse which section 67c was designed to combat." Id. at 764 (citations omitted).
The Telemart court's references to § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act seem principally intended to
illuminate the intent and purpose of Congress in amending § 67. The case did not involve




The question of whether section 2-702 of the Code should be
characterized as a codification of the common law fraud remedy is
critical to yet another attack by the trustee-the challenge under
section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act, 10 7 which invalidates state-created
priorities. Before 1938, the Act gave priority to debts of the bankrupt
owing to any persons who by the laws of any state or of the United
States were entitled thereto. 10 8 The 1938 amendment to section 64
eliminated this general recognition, usually consigning the party owed
such a debt to general creditor status.1 '" In Federal's,110 the bank-
ruptcy and district courts had held that section 2-702, whose employ-
ment by the seller was felt to be practically, if not legally, tied to the
buyer's petition in bankruptcy, was in effect a state-created priority in
clear defiance of the federal standards set out by section 64. 11 In In re
Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 112 however, the Ninth Circuit held section
2-702 not to be in conflict with section 64, essentially because of the
former's alleged basis in common law fraud, under which the seller
could recover from the trustee.
IV. A REVERSION TO COMMON LAW FRAUD
Two recent cases 1 3 have presented a new development which
would dramatically affect the success of credit sellers attempting to
reclaim in bankruptcy proceedings. Both cases involved the invalida-
tion of section 2-702 as a statutory lien under section 67c(I)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Act. In the first case, In re Wetson's, 1 14 Judge Herzog
found the exclusivity provision of section 2-702(2)115 inapplicable by
the following reasoning:
107. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
108. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 64, 30 Stat. 563 (current version at 11 U.S.C, §
104(a) (1970)).
109. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 64, 52 Stat. 874 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970)).
110. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd, 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich.
1975), rev'd, 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977).
111. See notes 130-33, 151-57 infra and accompanying text. See also In re Perskey &Wolf,
Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 812 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
112. 524 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 969 (1976).
113. In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Giltex,
Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also notes 136-40, 161 infra and
accompanying text.
114. 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
115. "Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on
the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay." U.C.C. §
2-702(2).
[Vol. 46
IN RE FEDERAL'S, INC.
Equitable considerations require that I reject the argument that since § 2-702 is by its
final sentence, made an exclusive remedy, once it is invalidated by § 67c(1)(A), the
seller is left without a remedy. I find the argument specious and the notion abhorrent
to a court of equity. Surely § 2-702 must be read together and the last sentence of
subsection (2) must be taken to mean that § 2-702 is the exclusive remedy if it survives
attack by the trustee, and if invalidated by § 67c(1)(A) the seller is not to be deprived
of any pre-Code remedy he may have had.116
In In re Giltex, 117 the court followed Judge Herzog's reasoning.
Thus, by a kind of end run, two cases have permitted sellers to
circumvent the many 2-702/Bankruptcy Act conflicts discussed above.
by allowing recourse to pre-Code fraud law where section 2-702 is
invalidated in bankruptcy. Since this approach allows a reversion to
nonuniform pre-Code remedies, it stands in ironic contrast to the
fundamental proposition that article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code was intended both to augment and to make uniform the various
remedies available to aggrieved parties to a sales contract.'" 8 Still, it is
not clear whether this reasoning, if more widely accepted, would
extend beyond the section 67c context to other bankruptcy provisions.
Also, the view of section 2-702(2)'s exclusivity provision taken in the
Wetson's case is, to say the least, uncertain.' 1 9 Moreover, the reclaim-
ing seller's problems in proving common law fraud are likely to exceed
his evidentiary difficulties under section 2-702,120 although, if he can
prove fraud, he could almost always triumph over the trustee. 12 1 All
things considered, it would seem that reclaiming credit sellers would
be well advised to include a common law fraud count in their
reclamation petitions.
V. In re Federal's, Inc.
A. Before the Bankruptcy Judge
While the facts giving rise to the Federal's litigation are fairly
simple, they present the basic situation common to almost all of the
cases involving the bankruptcy implications of section 2-702. On
August 10, 1972, the Matushita Electric Corporation ("Panasonic')
sold and delivered electronic equipment to Federal's, Inc. ("Feder-
al's', a Michigan corporation, the sale being on a credit basis. On
116. In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (footnote
omitted).
117. 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 197S).
118. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-102(2), 2-703, Comment 1.
119. See In re Goodson Steel Corp., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 387, 392 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
120. See notes 19-28 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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August 16, Federal's filed a petition under Chapter XI of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, and a receiver was appointed. Two days later, Panasonic
demanded return of the equipment by letters and telegrams sent to
Federal's and to its receiver. The goods, however, were not returned,
and Panasonic then initiated a reclamation petition before Bankruptcy
Judge George Brody. 122
Since the procedural requisites for utilizing section 2-702 were met,
stipulated, or reserved, 123 the basic questions confronted by Judge
Brody's opinion involved that section's interaction with sections 70(c),
64(a), and 67c of the Bankruptcy Act. With respect to section 70(c),
Judge Brody expressed a personal preference for subordinating the
seller to the lien creditor-trustee via section 2-702(3)'s "lien creditor"
language, 124 but felt constrained to follow the Sixth Circuit's decision
in In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 125 which compelled a reference to
common law to determine the priority as between seller and lien
creditor. 126 In looking to pre-Code law, however, he discussed deci-
sions dealing only with the relative rights of the defrauded seller and
the trustee qua representative of the debtor, 127 and not, as required by
section 70(c), the relative rights of seller and lien creditor. 128 On the
basis of these decisions, he concluded that, assuming insolvency upon
receipt of the goods, Panasonic's petition would have to be granted
were section 70(c) the only relevant bankruptcy provision. 129
However, Judge Brody then went on to consider section 2-702's
status with respect to sections 64(a) and 67c(l)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Act. 130 He reviewed the 1938 amendment to section 64(a) which
removed state-created priorities from recognition in bankruptcy' 3' and
concluded that Panasonic's claim would be defeated by that section,
122. In re Federal's Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd, 402 F. Supp.
1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975), rev'd, 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977).
123. Panasonic clearly did make a sufficient demand for the goods within ten days of their
receipt. In addition, the parties agreed to reserve the factual question whether Federal's received
the goods while insolvent, although it would seem likely that Federal's did do so. See U.C.C. §
1-201(23). Also, Panasonic stipulated that Federal's intended to pay for the goods. See 12 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 1144. See generally notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text.
124. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
125. 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968).
126. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1144-49, especially at 1148; see note 80supra and accompany-
ing text.
127. That is, Judge Brody discussed only cases decided under Bankruptcy Act sections other
than § 70(c). See 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1150.
128. Id. at 1148.
129. Id.
130. See generally notes 83-112 supra and accompanying text.
131. See notes 96, 108-09 supra and accompanying text.
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since "[s]ection 2.702 . . . read literally and practically gives to a
specified class of creditors a priority over general creditors upon the
insolvency of a debtor [and] confers upon a specified class of creditors
'preferential treatment as against the buyer's other creditors.' 132 In so
doing, he made a special note of the close practical relationship
between the bankruptcy petition and the reclamation petition in this
and many other such cases. 133 In construing section 67c(1)(A), Judge
Brody relied on two civil code cases 134 with statutory language some-
what similar to that of section 2-702(2). After noting that "[w]hether a
given statutory enactment confers lien rights is to be determined by the
practical effect of such legislation and not merely by reference to the
terminology employed," he concluded that "[t]he right to reclaim
conferred by § 2.702(2) realistically viewed is a statutory lien" ineffec-
tive in bankruptcy. 135
In Judge Brody's view, the effect of section 2-702's conflict with
Bankruptcy Act sections 64(a) and 67c(1)(A) was to render that section
totally inoperative in bankruptcy. 13 6 Perhaps for this reason, he cir-
cumvented 2-702's express exclusion of the common law fraud rem-
edy137 in stating that, since the Code was not applicable, Panasonic
would have recourse to that remedy. 138 However, since pre-Code
Michigan law required the buyer's intent to defraud, and since
Panasonic stipulated that Federal's had intended to pay for the
goods, 139 this option was disallowed, and Panasonic's reclamation
petition was denied. 140
132. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1151-52 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 3).
133. "The event that generally triggers the demand for reclamation is the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy. In all but one of the reclamation petitions filed in this case the demand for
reclamation was not made until after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy." Id. at 1152 n.22.
There were approximately 56 such petitions filed in the Federal's proceedings. Id. at 1144 n.3.
134. In re J.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188 (Ist Cir. 1971) (Puerto Rico law); In re Trahan.
283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930
(1969).
135. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1153.
136. "The Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress the right to establish
Uniform Laws on the Subject of Bankruptcy. A State therefore is without power to 'pass or
enforce laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act, or to provide additional or
auxiliary regulations.' If § 2.702 does therefore in fact conflict with the scheme of distribution
prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act it can have no operative effect in a bankruptcy proceeding."
Id. at 1151 (citations omitted).
137. "Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on
the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay." U.C.C. §
2-702(2). In fact, Judge Brody simply did not discuss this language.
138. See 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1153. See also notes 113-21 supra and accompanying text.
139. See note 123 supra.
140. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1153.
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B. In the District Court
On appeal to the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
the Bankruptcy Court decision favoring the receiver was affirmed,141
although the district court opinion presented significant departures
from that of Judge Brody. On the 70(c) question, the district court, like
Judge Brody, felt constrained to follow Mel Golde, but emphatically
disagreed with his discussion ,of pre-Code Michigan law. 142 After
correctly noting that the decisions employed by Judge Brody did not
involve the competing rights of defrauded seller and lien creditor as
required by section 70(c), it declared itself unable to find any Michigan
cases dealing with this precise point. 143 As a result, the district court
felt constrained to examine Michigan decisions involving the compet-
ing rights of a defrauded seller and a chattel mortgagee of the buyer,
noting that in such cases the chattel mortgagee who gave fresh
consideration for a mortgage securing a preexisting debt and who acted
in good faith reliance on the buyer's ostensible ownership of the goods
would typically triumph over the seller. 144 It then attempted to draw
an analogy between this situation and that of the lien creditor:
From the distinction . . . between the rights of one who takes a mortgage for an
antecedent debt, and a mortgagee who gives fresh consideration, it seems most
probable that the Michigan court would likewise have held that the rights of an
attachment lien creditor, whose lien secured credit extended after the delivery of
certain goods, were superior to a reclaiming seller whose demand for the goods
followed the creditor's attachment of those goods by legal process. In such a situation
the lien creditor may well have relied upon his debtor's ostensible ownership of the
goods in making the loan. If his levy or attachment precedes the seller's demand for
return of the goods, it is the lien creditor who has been the more diligent of the two
and he should prevail.' 4-
Having thus established to its satisfaction that a lien creditor who
extended credit (i.e., gave value) after the transfer of the goods to the
buyer but before the defrauded seller's attempt at reclamation would
141. In re Federal's, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975), rev'd, 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cr.
1977).
142. See id. at 1359. However, the court, like Judge Brody, did express its preference for
subordinating the seller to the lien creditor via 2-702(3). Id. at 1359-60 n.1.
143. Id. at 1359-60.
144. Id. at 1360-61. This is basically an application of the pre-Code rules regarding the
relative rights of a defrauded seller and a good faith purchaser for value. Under these rules, a
secured party (who was treated like a good faith purchaser for this purpose) was required to give
some sort of new corsideration (i.e., value) in exchange for the security obtained from the buyer
to cover a preexisting debt. See, e.g., Void, supra note 14, §§ 75-76, at 379-84.
145. 402 F. Supp. at 1360-61.
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defeat the seller under Michigan pre-Code law, 146 the court was forced
to consider "when this hypothetical creditor [created by section 70(c)]
must have extended to the bankrupt the credit which his lien se-
cures" 147 in order to determine the trustee's status as against
Panasonic. Relying on a decision 148 allegedly establishing that "the
hypothetical lien creditor must be viewed to have extended the credit
and secured his lien as of the date of the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy,' 149 the district court reversed Judge Brody's decision on
the 70(c) question, finding for the lien creditor/trustee:
In this case Federal's petition in bankruptcy was filed before Panasonic's demand and
thus . . . the receiver must be viewed as an "intervening" lien creditor, i.e. one who
extended credit and secured his lien between delivery and demand for reclamation.
Because this Court has determined that the Michigan courts would have found an
intervening lien creditor to have rights and equities superior to those of a reclaiming
seller, Panasonic's reclamation petition in bankruptcy must be denied. 150
On the section 64(a) and 67c questions, however, the district court
sided with Judge Brody, thus affirming his overall decision and finding
for the trustee on three more or less independent bases. Significant in
the resolution of both these questions was Panasonic's claim that
section 2-702(2) was basically a reenactment of the common law
remedy of rescission for fraud, and thus neither a true priority nor a
"solely statutory" lien. 15' However, since "at common law, there are
no reported cases which hold that the mere receipt of goods by an
insolvent, without more, was a fraud entitling the seller to rescind and
reclaim, [the district court concluded that] § 2-702 must be regarded as
a substantive change in the law of fraud and commercial transac-
tions.' I5 2 With respect to the section 64(a) question, this enabled the
court to conclude that "the equities which supported reclamation for
fraud from the buyer's trustee at common law do not spring from the
objective standards of § 2-702."'' 3 On the section 67c point, the court
used this difference to justify its conclusion that section 2-702(2) was
146. The court also attempted to utilize U.C.C. § 2-326 by analogy to support this conclusion.
See id. at 1361-62. See also note 82 supra.
147. 402 F. Supp. at 1362.
148. Lewis v. Manufacturers Natl Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961), aff'g In re Alikasovich, 275
F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1960). See also notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
149. 402 F. Supp. at 1363.
150. Id. (footnote omitted).
151. See notes 52-59, 86-90, 110-12 supra and accompanying text.
152. 402 F. Supp. at 1365.
153. Id. at 1367.
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not simply a reenactment of the common law remedy and was thus "a
statutory creation."154
In addition, the court addressed a number of other issues in reaching
its conclusion on the 64(a) and 67c questions. With respect to the
former, Panasonic had argued that the section 2-702(2) reclamation
right differed from a priority in three respects: 1) it is asserted only
against the insolvent buyer, while a priority is asserted against all
creditors of the bankrupt; 2) it relates only to specific goods-those
conveyed by the seller-while a priority applies to all of the buyer's
assets; and 3) it arises independently of bankruptcy, while a priority is
effective only upon institution of insolvency proceedings. 155 In re-
sponse to all of this, the court reasoned as follows:
When viewed in the actual context of bankruptcy administration these distinctions are
quite unpersuasive. It must be realized that all of a bankrupt's unsecured creditors (of
which any reclaiming sellers are a part) are competing for a pro-rata share of the fund,
if any, remaining after the satisfaction of all valid liens and § 64 priorities. If
reclamation is permitted in bankruptcy it will reduce the bankrupt's estate at the
obvious expense of all other unsecured creditors who do not enjoy the same standing to
assert their claim by accident of the fact that the value which they extended to the
bankrupt was something other than goods. Thus, reclamation clearly has the effect of
a priority in the distribution of the bankrupt's assets as of the date of bankruptcy. As
for Panasonic's third distinction, it is, of course, recognized that a seller's rights under
§ 2-702 may exist independent of proceedings in bankruptcy. However, here we are
only concerned with the validity of § 2-702 within the context of bankruptcy.' - 6
With respect to Panasonic's last suggested distinction, the court also
reemphasized Judge Brody's point that, practically speaking, the
bankruptcy petition and the demand for goods are obviously closely
related. 157
With regard to the section 67c question, Panasonic had also con-
tended that, while the 2-702(2) remedy is expressly made exclusive,'
a lienholder can also foreclose and obtain any balance between the
security and the debt. In response to this, the court stressed the
compensating "practical effect" of section 2-702 as a "powerful and
effective security device" operating to the detriment of other credi-
tors. 5 9 It also asserted that section 2-702 was the sort of state-created
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1366.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see notes 132-33 supra and accompanying text.
158. See note 93 supra.
159. 402 F. Supp. at 1367.
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priority at which the 1938 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act were
aimed. 160 Finally, the district court seemed tacitly to support Judge
Brody's suggestion that section 2-702 was totally inoperative in bank-
ruptcy and that the seller could thus attempt a reclamation based on
common law fraud. 161
C. In the Court of Appeals
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision, and remanded Federal's for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion. 162 As was necessitated by the trustee's three-pronged
claim, the circuit court decided contrary to the district court on each of
the Bankruptcy Act questions presented.
On the section 70(c) issue the court of appeals once more applied Mel
Golde, with its mandated reference to pre-Code state law to determine
the relative rights of seller and lien creditor. 163 The court summarized
the district court's reasoning on the question before it, and concluded
that it was dissatisfied with the district court's approach on two
allegedly independent grounds. 164 First, the Sixth Circuit rejected the
district court's contention that-the trustee could assume the position of
a lien creditor who both extended credit and perfected his lien subse-
quent to the delivery of the goods but prior to the seller's demand for
them. 165 Instead, it held that
the powers and rights of the hypothetical lien creditor under § 70c are ... the powers
of a creditor who obtains a lien upon the property of the debtor by legal or equitable
proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, but they in no way elevate that status by any
particular reference to the chronology of the underlying debt. 166
In so holding, the court relied principally upon its reading of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank 167:
Under Lewis and by the terms of the statute, the lien creditor is deemed to have
acquired that status "as of 'the date of bankruptcy'." It does not follow, however, that
160. Id. at 1367-68; see notes 108i-09 supra and accompanying text,
161. This was not possible here because of the absence of the requisite intent to defraud. See
402 F. Supp. at 1363. See also notes 136-40 supra and accompanying text.
162. In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977), re ,g 402 F. Supp. 1357 tE.D. Mich,
1975).
163. Id. at 511-12; see notes 80, 124-26, 142 supra and accompanying text-
164. 553 F.2d at 512-13. On the apparent intent to treat these two arguments as distinct bases
for the decision, see id. at 513 ("it is in error in two respects") and id. at 514 t"Even if").
165. Id. at 513-14; see notes 147-50 supra and accompanying text.
166. 553 F.2d at 514.
167. 364 U.S. 603 (1961); see note 148 supra and accompanying text.
1978]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46
the underlying debt which may have furnished the basis for the hypothetical lien must
also have been created precisely at that time, or at any other particular time. The
prohibition in Lewis of the imaginary extension of credit at a definite time that accords
a substantive right prior to the date of bankruptcy should not be construed as affecting
the basic assumption that a trustee's lien is based on antecedent debt extended an
indeterminate time prior to the date of bankruptcy.'
6
In so holding, the Sixth Circuit also tacitly declared itself in conflict
with the reading of section 70(c) implicitly adopted by the Third
Circuit's 1960 Kravitz decision. 169
The court of appeals then went on to attack the district court's
analysis of pre-Code Michigan law, but seemed to do so on the
assumption that its interpretation of section 70(c) was sufficient by
itself. The circuit court stated that, with one possible exception, the
cases cited by the lower court involved consensual, rather than judi-
cial, liens, and that section "70(c) requires us to look to the assumed
powers of the trustee based on liens obtained by legal proceedings, not
liens obtained consensually.' 170 It then cited some general authority to
168. 553 F.2d at 514. The court also mentioned a proposed 1956 amendment by the National
Bankruptcy Conference which would have had the same effect, but whose necessity was obviated
by Lewis. See id.
169. Id. See generally notes 68-75 supra and accompanying text. Although Kravitz did not
discuss the question in any detail, the pre-Code Pennsylvania cases on which it relied to support
the lien creditor-trustee's triumph over the seller clearly adopted the view that an attaching
creditor who had extended credit after the transfer of the goods was to be treated like a good faith
purchaser for value, and could thus reclaim the goods as against the defrauded seller. See
Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156 Pa. 258, 263-64, 27 A. 300, 301-02 (1893); Smith v. Smith, Murphy
& Co., 21 Pa. 367, 373 (1853); Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280, 285 (1901). This seems to
have been based on the creditor's right to rely on the buyer's apparent absolute ownership of the
goods. See Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156 Pa. 258, 263-64, 27 A. 300, 301-02 (1893). Thus, the
Kravitz decision necessarily rested on assumptions as to the meaning of § 70(c) basically similar to
those of the district court in Federal's, although it did not discuss the question in the same
fashion. Of course, Kravitz did predate the Supreme Court's Lewis decision. In addition, the
Pennsylvania pre-Code rule on the relative rights of defrauded seller and attaching creditor seems
to be a minority position. See note 185 infra.
Also, assuming the correctness of the district court's view of pre-Code Michigan Law (as the
circuit court, of course, did not), it is difficult to see how the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of §
70(c) can, by itself, justify the result it reached. If the trustee's powers under § 70(c) are merely
those of a hypothetical creditor who obtains his lien upon the date of bankruptcy and who may
have extended credit to the buyer at any time (or at no time) prior to that date, it is simply
impossible to determine the relative rights of the seller and such a creditor. According to the
district court's analysis, such a creditor would clearly have defeated the seller if he extended
credit after the transfer of the goods, but quite possibly would not have so triumphed had he
extended credit before that transfer. In order to answer the priority question, the trustee simply
must assert the status of one of these hypothetical creditors, but the Sixth Circuit's reading of §
70(c) makes it impossible for him to do so.
170. 553 F.2d at 515.
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the effect that a levy of execution conveyed to the creditor only such
title as was possessed by the debtor. 17 1 Since a buyer taking by fraud is
universally assumed to take only voidable title,17 2 this is of course
sufficient to support the court's contention that the defrauded seller
could reclaim the goods against the lien creditor-trustee, and that
Panasonic's claim was thus valid under section 70(c). Finally, it should
be noted that this line of reasoning by itself supports the court's
ultimate conclusion; in fact, it negates the need for its argument
regarding the interpretation of section 70(c).
In its relatively brief discussion of the section 67c question,
the Sixth Circuit utilized two basic arguments in holding that section
2-702(2) is not a statutory lien invalidated in bankruptcy. First, while
conceding that section "2-702 is more than a mere codification of
common law," it stated that "[b]ecause that right conceptually has its
antecedents in the historical and equitable right of a defrauded seller to
reclaim the goods he has sold to an insolvent buyer, we hold it cannot
be said to arise 'solely by force of statute.' ,173 Secondly, it emphasized
the "total lack of reference to § 2-702 in the legislative history of the
1966 amendments" 174 to section 67c, arguing:
So extensive a provision of state law would hardly escape notice if it were one of the
legitimate targets of the amendment. We attribute this absence of reference not to
oversight, but to the more likely explanation that the Congress viewed the Code
provision as did its authors: a basic updating of the equitable remedies of rescission.
The development of the Uniform Commercial Code, and its universal acceptance
marks this provision as anything but spurious. The Code represents the combined
empirical judgment of 49 states of the Union that the irrebuttable presumption of
fraud in § 2-702(2) conforms to the experience in the majority of cases .... The Code
is far more than a spurious state law created by special interests for their own special
protection. 175
The court was similarly brief in disposing of the trustee's section 64(a)
claim. Once more it stressed the common law genesis of section 2-702,
stating that "the rights reserved to the defrauded seller under that
section are the direct descendants of those historically preserved under
the common law and so respected by the Bankruptcy Act."' 7 6 Also, it
maintained that the section 2-702(2) right is a right to particular goods.
171. Id.
172. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
173. 553 F.2d at 516 (footnote omitted). For the text of § 1(29a) of the Bankruptcy Act, which
defines the term "statutory lien," see text accompanying note 87 supra.
174. 553 F.2d at 516; see notes 99-101 supra and accompanying text.
175. 553 F.2d at 516-17 (footnote omitted).
176. Id. at 518.
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Thus, it is unlike a priority, which "contemplates a claim which is
satisfied from the general assets of the bankrupt's estate and is asserted
after the satisfaction of secured liens but before the debts of general
creditors [and which] should not depend for its existence upon the
contingency of whether specific assets are within the bankrupt's es-
tate.1 177 To the district court's contention that this argument involved
form more than substance and obviously worked to the disadvantage
of general creditors, 178 the court of appeals simply responded that this
disadvantage inheres in all successful reclamation petitions.1 79
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. Section 70(c)
Despite the considerable attention it devoted to the section 70(c)
issue, the Sixth Circuit's Federal's decision will probably be least
significant with respect to that question. While its basic holding that
resolution of the priority question demands a return to common law' 80
is in accord with other circuit court decisions, 181 and might tend to
counteract a trend toward utilization of section 2-702(3) by some
bankruptcy referees, 182 in so holding the court was only following the
Sixth Circuit rule formerly announced in Mel Golde. Moreover, be-
cause of its conclusion that pre-Code Michigan law actually followed
the general rule favoring the defrauded seller over the lien creditor, 183
its labored discussion of Lewis and the proper interpretation of section
70(c)184 will probably not produce many repercussions. 185 Finally, the
177. Id.
178. See note 156 supra and accompanying text.
179. 553 F.2d at 518.
180. See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
181. See In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6t.h Cir. 1968); In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d
820 (3d Cir. 1960).
182. This return to the common law will generally mean that the seller who meets the
requirements of § 2-702 will triumph over the trustee. See notes 81-82 supra and accompanying
text.
183. See notes 170-72 supra and accompanying text. See also note 185 infra.
184. See notes 165-69 supra and accompanying text.
185. However, the court's reading of the Lewis decision could, if generally accepted, make It
impossible for the trustee to defeat the seller in the few states allowing the lien creditor to triumph
at common law, at least to the extent that such states rely on good faith purchaser-type
"chronology of the debt" distinctions to do so. See notes 144-45, 169 supra and accompanying
text. It remains to be seen whether its refusal to look to this chronology for § 70(c) purposes will
be generally accepted, and, in any event, Kravitz still tacitly points the other way. See id. As just
suggested, though, this whole question is probably rendered moot by the nearly unanimous
common law view that the lien creditor should not be given good faith purchaser status and
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Federals decision obviously can do nothing to counteract the uncer-
tainty in those states that have struck the "lien creditor" language from
section 2-702(3).186
B. Sections 67c and 64(a)
Although the court devoted somewhat less attention to the 67c and
64(a) questions, the impact of its decision may well be greatest in these
areas. After the Federals decision, the only two circuit court cases to
consider these issues have ruled in favor of the section 2-702 seller. 187
Both decisions relied heavily on the generally persuasive theme of
section 2-702(2)'s close relationship with the common law remedy of
rescission for fraud, which traditionally was never confused with a
statutory lien or a state-created priority. In addition, the Federal's
court gave considerable attention to the rather glaring omission of any
mention of Section 2-702 from the legislative history accompanying the
1967 amendments to section 67c. The 67c and 64(a) questions have
always had the air of bankruptcy referee-designed contrivances for
avoiding the pro-seller implications of Kravitz, 188 and the Sixth Cir-
cuit's general disregard of the strained technicalities often employed by
such forums could perhaps work decisively to diminish their influence.
In conclusion, despite possible reservations, the Sixth Circuit's Fed-
eral's decision is on the whole quite defensible, and almost certainly
should not defeat the defrauded seller. See J. Benjamin, Law of Sales of Personal Property,
477-78 (7th Am. ed. 1899); F. Burdick, Law of Sales 205 (3d ed. 1913); 2 F. Mechem, Law of Sales
§ 924 (1901); F. Tiffany, Law of Sales § 56, at 194 (2d ed. 1908); Void, supra note 14, § 76, at
381. The basic reason for this view was that the attaching creditor gave no new value or
consideration for his taking. Thus, good faith purchaser status being denied the lien creditor, he
would lose to the defrauded seller because of the buyer's lack of full title. See notes 15-17 supra
and accompanying text. It is perhaps not completely clear, however, whether this general rule
was to apply to the lien creditor who took the goods on the basis of a debt incurred by, or credit
extended to, the buyer after he fraudulently obtained them from the seller. See notes 144-45, 169
supra and accompanying text. The actual taking, of course, would never be accompanied by the
giving of fresh consideration or value. The debt providing a basis for that taking would,
however, typically have involved such consideration, and both the early Pennsylvania courts and
the district court in Federals seemed to regard the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
obligation itself, and not those surrounding the subsequent attachment, as significant in determin-
ing whether a lien creditor should be regarded as a good faith purchaser for value entitled to
recover as against the defrauded seller. See id.
186. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
187. See In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977); In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc.,
524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 969 (1976).
188. In Kravitz, of course, the trustee triumphed because of Pennsylvania's relatively unique
common law rule. See notes 72-75, 169 supra. However, the Kravit court's argument for
recourse to common law would clearly favor the seller in most states. See notes 81, 185 supra and
accompanying text.
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will have some impact on the longstanding and variegated dispute
regarding the relative rights of the section 2-702 seller and the bank-
ruptcy trustee. As indicated, this influence is likely to be rather broad
and diffuse, varying somewhat from issue to issue and context to
context. But the Federal's decision is at least not likely to increase the
prevailing confusion in the area, and may even work to reduce it to
some degree. Unfortunately, this is not a claim which can be made for
every decision affecting this troubled area of the law.
